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Abstract 
Market-heavy welfare systems, in which low or moderate state benefits are topped up by 
private welfare arrangements, are expected to undermine political support for the extension of 
social rights and perpetuate benefit fragmentation over time. And where low state benefits are 
means-tested, political support is expected to be particularly prone to erosion. In this paper I 
develop the argument that the combination of private pension insurance and means-testing 
does not always perpetuate fragmentation. Rather, it structures the policy preferences of 
pension industry representatives and right-of-centre parties such that these actors push for 
reforms to make the state pension more universal. I make my argument by examining the 
reform history of nine market-heavy pension systems in the three decades since 1980. A fuzzy-
set Qualitative Comparative Analysis (fsQCA) maps the conditions under which 
universalizing reforms have occurred, and two case studies link institutional conditions to 
reform outcomes via the policy preferences of key political actors.  
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Rethinking the paradox of redistribution: how 
private insurance and means testing can lead to 
universalizing reform 
 
 
Introduction 
 
In the comparative study of welfare states, both private insurance and means-tested 
welfare arrangements are considered to be dualizing, fragmenting the benefit system 
and leading to different rights, entitlements and services being provided to different 
categories of recipients. Moreover, there is a formidable consensus, from Moene and 
Wallerstein, to Korpi and Palme, Rothstein, and Pierson (Korpi & Palme, 1998; Moene 
& Wallerstein, 2001; Pierson, 2001; Rothstein, 1998), that such benefit arrangements 
undermine political support for the extension of state-provided social rights, and 
perpetuate fragmentation over time.  
 
Where private insurance is prevalent fewer people rely on state benefits, making them 
more prone to retrenchment (Pierson, 1996). For Korpi and Palme, it is class not the 
number of welfare beneficiaries that matters, but the argument is much the same. 
Residual state benefits that leave room for the market are more vulnerable to erosion 
than benefits that are encompassing or universal, because the interests of the middle-
classes are decoupled from those of the working class (Korpi & Palme, 1998). And 
where benefits are means-tested or ‘targeted’ on the needy, it is particularly obvious 
that the beneficiaries of the welfare state and those who finance it are rarely the same 
individuals. Public discussion tends to centre around what the well-adjusted majority 
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should do about the less well-adjusted minority, and benefits are susceptible to 
retrenchment on the grounds of ‘fairness’ (Rothstein, 1998: 158). 
 
For no policy area are these logics likely to apply so strongly as for the policy area of 
pensions - a classic example of path dependent change due to the long duration of 
pension promises (Myles and Pierson, 2001). Both ‘basic social security’ pensions that 
provide a low level of entitlements based on contributions, and ‘targeted’ pensions 
where eligibility to a low level of benefits is means-tested, leave the middle-classes to 
safeguard their standards of living through private insurance. As a result they are 
expected to undermine the cross-class coalitions necessary for their preservation, and 
become less generous over time. This is the ‘paradox of redistribution’ (Korpi & 
Palme, 1998). Public pensions that focus on poverty relief are expected to become in 
this way increasingly residual. 
 
In this paper, I develop the argument that rather than eroding political support for 
state-provided pensions and perpetuating fragmentation over time, the combination of 
means-testing and private insurance generates political pressure for more universal benefit 
arrangements. Specifically, by more universal benefit arrangements I mean any policies 
which loosen targeting, include new categories of people under social insurance, 
loosen eligibility requirements to the state pension, or alter the benefit calculation 
formula such that people previously receiving means tested benefits now receive 
benefits as a contributory right. I develop my argument in three stages. The argument 
is set out in more detail in Section I) below. 
 
First, I present a ‘least likely’ case. Australia’s ‘targeted’ pension system has a ratio of 
private to public pension expenditure that lies high above the OECD average 
(Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 2013a, 2013b). According 
to current understandings of how welfare institutions structure pension politics, we 
should fully expect to see an erosion of the Australian state pension and the 
Margarita Gelepithis  
              
3 
perpetuation of benefit fragmentation - Australia is a ‘least likely’ case for 
universalizing reform. Yet, although reforms in the 1980s made the state pension more 
residual, this trend has since been decisively reversed. The Australian state pension 
has become more generous and more universal. By tracing the process of reform, I 
show how the combination of targeting and private insurance structured the 
preferences of Australian pension industry representatives such that they began to 
advocate a more universal state pension, and how this advocacy led to universalizing 
reforms under a right-of-centre Coalition government.  
 
Next, I test the generalizability of my argument. I show that over the past three 
decades, state pensions have not become more residual in countries with prevalent 
private pension insurance. Rather, among the set of ‘market-heavy’ pension systems 
(the nine countries where the ratio of private to public expenditure is higher than the 
OECD average), there has been a surprising trend towards more universal state 
pensions - at the very time when means-testing and the dualization of social 
entitlements have generally been increasing (Emmenegger, Häusermann, Palier, & 
Seeleib-Kaiser, 2012: 8; Palier, 2010). With the exception of Ireland, the Qualitative 
Comparative Analysis (QCA) presented in this section of the paper shows that every 
reform that made the state pension more universal in market-heavy pension systems 
since 1980 had at its root a mismatch between private pensions means testing.  
 
The QCA makes it possible to suggest political and institutional conditions under 
which this mismatch can bring about more universal pensions. In the cases under 
consideration, the combination of means testing and private insurance has led to 
reform under right-of-centre governments, where there is a low rate of national 
saving, and where the earnings-related state pension is small. While the importance 
of a right-of-centre government and a low rate of national savings will already be 
apparent from the Australian case, Australia provides insufficient temporal variation 
to examine the role of the earnings-related state pension. In addition, the UK emerges 
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from the QCA as a seemingly deviant case of reform under left-of-centre government. 
I therefore complete my argument with a final case study, zooming in on the UK 
where the earnings-related state pension has been dramatically eroded over time. I 
show how despite appearances, it was the political right that drove the UK reforms. I 
begin by setting out the rationale for why the combination of means testing and 
private insurance can lead to more universal state pensions. 
 
 
I) Why means testing and private insurance can lead to more 
universal state pensions 
 
I take as my starting point the idea that there is an institutional mismatch between 
means-testing and private insurance that leads to pressure for more universal 
pensions, just as the mismatch between contributory insurance and atypical 
employment shapes the pension politics of Continental Europe (Häusermann, 2010). 
Green-Pedersen (2003) draws attention to this institutional disharmony in his analysis 
of recent Danish pension reforms, where moves in the universal direction were mostly 
driven by right-of-centre parties focusing on making work and savings pay. He argues 
that right-of-centre parties pushed for more universal benefits because they were 
more ‘market conforming’ than means-tested benefits and did not damage incentives 
to take a job or save privately for retirement. Whereas entitlement to contributory or 
‘universal’ state pensions is not affected by individual savings, entitlement to a means-
tested state pension may be drastically reduced if an individual has built up a private 
pension, and this may act as a significant disincentive to private saving for retirement. 
However, rather than expecting universalizing reform to result from any ideological 
commitment of right-of-centre governments to encouraging the market, the argument 
developed in this paper emphasizes the causal role of particular social interests. 
Where targeted pensions are prevalent and state pension entitlements are means-
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tested, those who have saved privately for retirement may find their state pension 
reduced. For this reason they may benefit from universalizing reforms such as 
lowering the rate at which public pensions are withdrawn with growing pension 
income or lowering contributions requirements to the state pension. This logic, which 
stems from the mismatch between means testing and private pensions, is hereafter 
referred to as the ‘private savings’ logic of reform. 
  
Notwithstanding the uneven coverage of voluntary private pensions in favour of 
those on high incomes, I expect that in market-heavy systems private pensions will be 
sufficiently prevalent that those affected by means-testing will cut across the political 
spectrum, and both right and left-of-centre parties will count amongst their 
constituents a significant number of individuals who stand to gain from 
universalizing reforms.  
 
However, in a post-industrial setting, expansionary reforms are difficult. Indeed, they 
are rarely studied and scholarly emphasis has been placed on explaining 
retrenchment and recalibration (Huber & Stephens, 2001; Pierson, 2001). While some 
insist that right-of-centre parties shrink state entitlements and left-of-centre parties 
expand them (Hicks, 1999; Korpi & Palme, 2003; L Scruggs & Allan, 2004), others claim 
that party roles have been reversed, with left-of-centre parties now more capable of 
retrenchment than right-of-centre parties (Cukierman & Tommasi, 1998; Green-
Pedersen, 2001; Ross, 2000). These authors point to the effect of a ‘Nixon goes to China’ 
logic. In a nutshell, since left-of-centre parties are associated with defending the 
welfare state they may have more leeway in retrenching or restructuring it. 
 
Drawing on this idea, I expect that universalizing reform may be less feasible for left-
of-centre parties than it is for right-of-centre parties. Just as left-of-centre parties ‘own’ 
the welfare state issue, right-of-centre parties may be said to ‘own’ the fiscal rectitude 
issue. A right-of-centre party could gain from initiating popular expansionary reforms 
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and has little to lose, as left-of-centre parties are unlikely to gain votes by attacking 
welfare state expansion. Turning the classic ‘Nixon goes to China’ argument on its 
head therefore, it is right-of-centre parties that can be expected to initiate 
universalizing public pension reforms. 
 
In sum, the starting point for my argument is that the combination of means testing 
and private insurance generates pressure to make the state pension more universal. 
This is because those who save privately for retirement and find their eligibility for 
state benefits reduced under the means-tested status quo could benefit from 
universalizing reform. In the post-industrial context, I expect that universalizing 
reform is more likely to be introduced by right-of-centre governments with a 
reputation for fiscal rectitude. In the next section, I show how the ‘private savings’ 
reform logic has been at work in the case of Australia, a targeted, market-heavy 
pension system that has become more generous and more universal since the mid 
1990s. 
 
 
II) Australia: a least likely case of universalizing reform 
 
Australia’s flat-rate general taxation financed Age Pension was tightly means tested 
at its inception in 1908. Over the years eligibility conditions were successively 
loosened, transforming it from a benefit tightly targeted on the poor to one that 
covered over 80 per cent of the population by the mid-1970s (Cliath, 2007; National 
Pensions Board, 1993). The trend towards ever more universal pension arrangements 
came abruptly to a halt however in 1982 when the Hawke Labour government came 
to power in the midst of a recession.  
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Labor’s fiscal imperative 
 
The Hawke government was determined to gain the support of business and prove 
its fiscal reliability. It departed from the policies of the previous Labor (ALP) 
government with a major restructuring of the welfare state, marked by increased 
means-testing and selectivity (F.G. Castles & Mitchell, 1993; Lyle Scruggs, 2004). 
Pensions were among the first benefits to be more tightly targeted. The income test 
was tightened for those over seventy, and the means test was reformed to apply the 
income or the assets test depending on which gave the lower pension level.  
 
Individually, these reforms were electorally unpopular, and the opposition gained 
some popularity by promising to abolish the assets test (Francis G. Castles, 2001: 8; 
Weatherley, 1994: 157). But the ALP’s display of fiscal rectitude paid off at the ballot 
box in 1984, and opposition pressure to abolish the assets test dissipated. The reasons 
for this were twofold. First, the abolition of the assets test was unpopular with 
representatives of Australian business (Power, 1988). Second, the opposition’s 
proposal to abolish the assets test sat awkwardly with their own emphasis on 
budgetary surplus and their very public calls for further tightening of eligibility 
criteria to social security on the grounds of reducing government spending (Business 
Council of Australia, 1988: 1618).  
 
At the same time as the Hawke government was making the state pension more 
tightly targeted, it was also working to make private pensions more universal. In 1992, 
the government introduced the 'Superannuation Guarantee'. Employers were 
required to make superannuation contributions on behalf of their employees, and 
would be fined if they failed to comply (Power, 1988; The Australian Financial Review, 
1989a). The Superannuation Guarantee became the Hawke government's flagship 
policy. In addition to addressing the issue of earnings replacement in old age, it was 
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a high profile way of addressing the low national savings rate, which had become a 
media obsession by the late 1980s (Commonwealth Treasury of Australia, 2001). With 
the Superannuation Guarantee, private savings could be increased without increasing 
spending on tax incentives; public expenditure could remain tight and be further 
reduced over time. Building on the tightening of the means test, the Superannuation 
Guarantee would make the Age Pension increasingly residual as more people built 
up private superannuation and became ineligible for state benefits. National savings 
would improve through a combination of public and private savings.  
 
Seeds of change 
 
The ALP lost the 1996 election to a coalition of the Australian Liberal and National 
Parties led by John Howard, for reasons largely unrelated to superannuation or the 
Age Pension (Cavalier, 1989; Dodson, 1989; 1989b). The Superannuation Guarantee 
had been opposed by Howard, and the new Coalition government was suspicious of 
the Association of Superannuation Funds of Australia (ASFA), the peak lobby group 
headed by former Labour Minister Susan Ryan. Nevertheless, the Coalition 
government accepted that the Superannuation Guarantee was here to stay, and began 
to pursue a retirement policy broadly similar to that of the ALP. The Age Pension was 
to become more tightly targeted as the ALP had envisaged. Once again, this was 
legitimized by the need to increase national savings (Goot & Watson, 2007; McAllister, 
1996). But the Coalition’s commitment to a more tightly targeted Age Pension was not 
to last long. 
 
The further tightening of the means test was not popular with the superannuation 
industry, which had grown significantly as a result of ALP policies. ASFA wanted a 
higher financial asset threshold(Liberal Party of Australia & National Party of 
Australia, 1996: 3). They stepped up their longstanding campaign to bring national 
Margarita Gelepithis  
              
9 
savings to the forefront of media attention, but crucially, they emphasized private 
rather than public savings. They issued public statements noting that household 
savings had shrunk to a near historical low, and insisted that private savings were the 
way to fix the current account deficit (Kavanagh, 1996). Media emphasis began to shift 
from government saving to private saving, and the battle to make people save became 
'the nation's prime economic soap opera' (Smith, 1998). 
 
The superannuation industry insisted on reform of 'the interaction between private 
retirement income and the Age Pension' (Megalogenis, 1999). For some industry 
actors, like the Institute of Actuaries and parts of the insurance industry, this meant 
adopting a fully universal Age Pension and a virtual elimination of any means tests 
(Smith, 1998). The majority of the financial and banking industry however did not 
have the appetite for such full-on reform, and simply demanded a loosening of the 
means tests. 
 
A change in policy direction  
 
The Coalition government soon began to realise that a focus on private savings could 
be used to justify a shift from fiscal rectitude to expansionary loosening of the means 
tests. In the run up to the 1998 election, the Coalition government announced its 
intention to introduce a 2.5 per cent increase in the income test ‘free’ areas applied to 
the Age Pension, and loosen the income test for pensions by reducing the taper rate 
from 50 per cent to 40 per cent. These benefits were justified on the grounds that they 
would ‘improve incentives to save for retirement by increasing the returns from such 
saving’ (Blue, 1996; Dunstan, 1993). The Coalition government was re-elected. It 
introduced the changes to the means test as set out in the pre-election schedule, 
reversing the tightening of targeting which had so infuriated ASFA in 1996 (Costello, 
1998).  
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In doing so, the Coalition pushed aside calls from business representatives to address 
national savings through tightening government spending. In their submission to the 
Budget process of 2001, the Business Council of Australia (BCA) had suggested that 
private saving should be encouraged by 'building upon the existing mandatory 
program of superannuation savings' and removing 'remaining biases against saving 
in the tax system' rather than loosening Age Pension eligibility conditions. In fact, the 
BCA had called for 'tighter targeting of transfers to those in greatest need' (Costello, 
2000). 
 
The universalizing reforms implemented by the Coalition government in 2000 and 
2001 were to be the first in a series of popular yet fiscally costly measures, intended to 
change the Howard government’s image ‘from mean and tricky to caring and sharing’ 
(Business Council of Australia, 2001: 11). The reforms were picked up by some 
commentators as an attempt to buy votes (Hayes, 2002; Megalogenis, 1999, 2006), and 
deemed bribery by the ALP. Yet opposition leader Kim Beazley was ‘not about to 
suggest that a Labour government would take away these hand-outs’ (P. Kelly, 2001; 
Steketee, 2001), and superannuation industry representatives continued the campaign 
to draw attention to low private savings (Frith, 2001; Richardson, 2001).  
 
So the reforms continued. In 2005, the Coalition abolished the Superannuation 
Surcharge amidst a flurry of press releases pointing out that this would encourage 
saving (Wilson, 2003). The following year, the Coalition announced its most generous 
budget to date (Commonwealth of Australia, 2005). The most expensive part of the 
‘Santa Claus Budget’ (Costello, 2006) was a more generous assets test for the Age 
Pension. The taper rate was halved, and the assets test threshold raised from $343,750 
to $529,250 (Tanner, 2006). Once again, the justification for loosening targeting was 
that it constituted a ‘large disincentive to save for retirement’ (Negline, 2007; 
Parliament of Australia, 2006). 
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The changes were implemented with the Tax Laws Amendment (Simplified 
Superannuation) Bill of 2007. The package received cross-party support, and the 
superannuation industry pronounced the Liberal Party 'the official party of 
Superannuation' (Association of Superannuation Funds of Australia, 2006: 30; 
Parliament of Australia, 2006; Ryan, 2006; Small Independent Superannuation Funds 
Association, 2006). Soon after the reforms, the Treasury announced that the Age 
Pension should be considered integral rather than peripheral to retirement incomes 
(House of Representatives, 2006). The Coalition had not only introduced significant 
universalizing pension reforms, it had also moved away from the ALP's stated vision 
of a more residual Age Pension. 
 
The private savings logic of reform in Australia 
 
The preceding narrative shows an ALP eager to prove its fiscal rectitude to business 
and the electorate, embarking on successive tightening of Age Pension eligibility 
conditions and extending private saving with the explicit intention of making the Age 
Pension increasingly residual over time. By contrast, the Coalition had the 
reputational leeway to introduce a series of expansionary budgets that included 
popular reforms easing the mismatch between targeting and private pensions that 
was affecting increasing numbers of people.  
 
Even for the Coalition however, the decision to loosen the means test was not an 
obvious one. When it came to power in 1996, the Coalition initially continued to 
emphasize deficit reduction and the tightening of targeting. It was only after 
representatives of the superannuation industry started to publicly emphasize low 
private savings that the Coalition began to loosen the means tests. Although loosening 
the means tests entailed popular benefit increases for those whose private savings 
would otherwise reduce their entitlement to a state pension, the Coalition had played 
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a large part in the construction of the fiscal imperative during its time in opposition. 
It justified its expansionary pension policies by highlighting how they would reduce 
disincentives to save and in doing so improve the country’s low national savings.  
 
Low national savings facilitated but did not drive the universalizing reforms. After 
all, a variety of policy responses were offered for the same national savings problem. 
When low national savings were first identified as a primary policy concern in the 
1980s, the ALP responded by targeting the Age Pension more tightly to increase state 
saving, whilst at the same time introducing the Superannuation Guarantee to expand 
private saving. In its first term in government, the Coalition framed the problem of 
low national savings as business representatives had done, as one of fiscal profligacy 
to be tackled primarily by increasing state saving. By its second term, the Coalition 
had taken the superannuation industry’s lead and reframed the problem of low 
national savings to emphasize deficient national saving. The narrative thus shows that 
the ‘private savings’ logic of universalizing reform is not a functional response to low 
savings. It is eminently political, driven by the potential electoral popularity of 
universalizing reforms. 
 
The next section maps the changes that have occurred in other market-heavy pension 
systems over the three decades since 1980, and finds a trend towards more universal 
state pensions. To test the generalizability of the ‘private savings’ logic as an 
explanation for these reforms, I conduct a fuzzy-set QCA. The fsQCA procedure is a 
formalized process of comparison. It involves breaking cases up into variables – a 
number of conditions and an outcome – which can be systematically compared to find 
the conditions that are present or absent when an outcome of interest is observed. It 
works well with small-to-medium n research designs where in-depth case knowledge 
is possible, and is capable of capturing conjunctural causation, where causally 
relevant conditions do not display their effects on their own but only together with 
other conditions. This is crucial for the argument of this paper, where means testing 
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and private insurance lead to universalizing reform only when combined, and under 
favourable political circumstances. 
 
 
III) Testing and refining the argument – A fuzzy-set QCA of 
market-heavy pension systems 
 
I define market-heavy pension systems as those where the ratio of private to public 
expenditure is higher than the OECD average, and focus on the eighteen mature 
welfare states included in The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism (Esping-Andersen, 
1990) and commonly used in comparative welfare state research thereafter. 1  This 
yields a set of nine market-heavy pension systems: Australia, Canada, Denmark, 
Ireland, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Switzerland, the United States and the United 
Kingdom.2 
 
The trend towards more universal state pensions in market-heavy 
systems 
 
Overall between 1980 and 2008 there has been an increase in the number of 
universalizing reforms to the state pension in market-heavy pension systems, and a 
simultaneous decrease in ‘de-universalizing’ reforms that increase the role of 
targeting.  
 
Table 1 presents the number of universalizing and de-universalizing reforms that 
occurred per decade. 
                                                 
1 This excludes less frequently analyzed Iceland and Israel, as well as the more recently privatized systems 
of Latin America and Central and Eastern Europe. 
2 Data for the full list of OECD countries is presented in the appendix. 
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Table 1. Total number of universalizing and de-universalizing reforms 
Decade Number of universalizing reforms Number of de-universalizing reforms 
1980s 2 7 
1990s 4 6 
2000s 6 2 
Source: author’s own database of reform, see appendix 
 
This trend towards more universal state pensions has been driven by Australia, the 
UK, New Zealand and Ireland.3 In Ireland, reforms over the last three decades have 
pushed the pension system in a consistently more universal direction. They have 
dramatically increased the number of people qualifying for pensions based on their 
social insurance record rather than through means testing, by extending the coverage 
of the contributory state pension to the self-employed (1988) and to part-time workers 
(1991), introducing a system of disregards for carers (1994) and loosening the means 
test (2007).  
 
In Australia, New Zealand and the UK, reforms shifted away from universalism in 
the 1980s but have been replaced in recent years with universalizing reforms. As 
discussed in the case study, reforms in the 1980s made the Australian Age Pension 
less universal by tightening the means tests (1983, 1985), but the trend since has been 
reversed with the introduction in the 2000s of two universalizing reforms that together 
extended coverage significantly by loosening the means test. In New Zealand the 
affluence test that was introduced in 1986 and increased further in 1990 was repealed 
in 1997, leaving a universal flat-rate state pension conditional only on residence. The 
UK moved towards targeting initially, by moving from earnings to price indexation 
of the state pension in 1980. But in the last decade the UK passed three reforms 
increasing the universalism of the state pension, introducing credits for carers and 
                                                 
3 See appendix for a full list of reforms. 
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disabled people with broken work records to enable them to build up entitlements to 
the state pension (2000), loosening the means test on the Minimum Income Guarantee 
(2002), and re-introducing earnings uprating as well as lowering the required 
contributions for a full basic state pension from 45 years to 30 years (2007).  
 
In Switzerland and Denmark no clear trend emerges. In Denmark reforms loosening 
the income test for the pension supplement (1987) and introducing contribution 
credits for benefits recipients (1996) alternated with reforms that shifted towards 
targeting (1993, 2003), whilst in Switzerland reforms tightening the means test (1983) 
and shifting individuals towards targeting (2003) have been punctuated by the 
introduction of contribution credits (1995). In the meantime the US, Canada and the 
Netherlands did not introduce any universalizing reforms at all.  
 
Thus, although market-heavy pension systems overall have seen an increase in 
reforms that make the state pension more universal, there is cross-national variation 
around this trend, which has been driven by four countries – the UK, New Zealand, 
Australia and Ireland. The fsQCA harnesses this variation to identify the conditions 
under which moves towards more universal state pensions have occurred. 
 
Setting up the fsQCA 
 
The fsQCA covers reforms in the nine market-heavy pension systems between 1980 
and 2009. The data is split into three decades 1980-1989, 1990-1999, and 2000-2009, and 
the analysis is run not with nine country cases, but with twenty-seven country-decade 
cases. This offers analytical leverage by introducing variation in causal conditions 
over time.  
 
The choice of country-decades as cases strikes balance between the idea that change 
in relevant causal conditions leads to reform and the idea that reform is not an instant 
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reaction to such change. In addition, the fsQCA was conducted using country-five-
years as cases. The results, which are included in the appendix, are consistent with the 
analysis of country-decades and lend further support to this choice of analytical unit.  
 
The outcome of interest is the presence of universalizing reform. For each country-
decade, membership is calibrated in the fuzzy-set ‘reform’ according to how much any 
needs-based or contributory arrangements restrict coverage.  
 
Three of the five causal conditions included in the model follow directly from my 
theoretical argument and case study. The first of these conditions is the prevalence of 
targeting within the pension system (hi_targ), which, in combination with prevalent 
private insurance, should result in key political actors having an interest in 
universalizing reform.  
 
Since all the countries in my analysis are market-heavy, I do not need to include a 
separate condition to capture the ‘private savings’ logic of reform. However, to 
capture the expectation that in the post-industrial context it may be difficult for left-
of-centre governments to respond to this logic, the second condition included in the 
analysis is the presence of a right-of-centre government (non_left). 
 
A low rate of national savings (lo_natsav) is included as a condition since the Australian 
case shows how low rates of national saving can be used by governments to legitimize 
a shift in focus, from fiscal restraint to the encouragement of private savings. 
 
Two further conditions are included in the model on the basis of the case knowledge 
gained during the iterative QCA research process (Ragin, 2000; Schneider and 
Wagemann, 2012: 81). The first of these conditions is the absence of a significant earnings-
related state pension (lo_erel), which turns out to be a crucial part of the private savings 
logic of reform. As the UK case study will show, a low earnings-related state pension 
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mobilizes pension industry representatives to put disincentives to private saving on 
the political agenda.  
 
These second is the presence of social insurance finance rather than general taxation finance 
(broad_fin). This condition is included to capture the exceptional nature of the Irish 
reforms. In the 1980s and early 1990s, Ireland was unique among market-heavy 
pension systems in excluding large social groups from the contributory pension 
system. By the early 1990s, the restricted coverage of the contributory pension had 
created a reliance on means-testing that in turn generated an interest in universalizing 
reforms among those who paid for both their own pension through social insurance 
contributions as well as the means-tested benefits of others through general taxation. 
This interest was manifested politically in the union-driven extension of contributory 
pension coverage first to the self-employed and certain public sector workers in 1988, 
and then to part-time workers in 1991 (Schulze & Moran, 2006a). Thus, rather than 
reflecting a private savings reform logic stemming from a mismatch between means-
testing and private insurance, early Irish reforms reflect a ‘cost sharing’ logic 
stemming from a mismatch between means testing and a restricted contributory 
system.  
 
The measurement and calibration of both outcome and causal conditions are 
presented in detail in the appendix. Fuzzy-set conditions contain more information 
than crisp-set conditions and are used wherever possible. The resulting analysis is 
therefore fuzzy-set, and conducted using the specialist software fsQCA2.5. Since an 
analysis of necessary conditions found no causally relevant necessary conditions for 
universalizing reform, the discussion focuses on sufficient conditions.  
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Conditions associated with universalizing reform in market-heavy 
systems 
 
The results of the analysis of sufficient conditions are summarized in Table 2 below. 
The ‘intermediate’ solution forms the centre of discussion. The intermediate solution 
makes theoretically guided (‘directional’) assumptions about whether logically 
possible combinations of conditions for which there is no corresponding empirical 
case (‘logical remainders’) would contribute to the outcome if they did exist. It then 
uses these assumptions to inform the logical minimization process, generating 
solution terms that are usually simpler than the ‘conservative’ solution which makes 
no assumptions about logical remainders, and more meaningful than the 
‘parsimonious’ solution which assumes that all logical remainders would contribute 
to the outcome.  
 
The directional assumptions used in the model directly follow from the theoretical 
discussion. The prevalence of targeting, the absence of a significant earnings-related 
pension, the presence of a non-left government, and the presence of a low rate of 
national saving are each assumed to contribute to bringing about reform. Since the 
financing arrangements of a pension system are relevant under the ‘cost-sharing’ logic 
of reform but are not expected to be relevant under the ‘private savings’ logic of 
reform, no directional assumption is made for the condition ‘broad_fin’. The 
parsimonious and conservative solutions are included in the appendix. 
 
The Boolean algebraic solution term at the top of Table 2 reveals three combinations 
of conditions that are sufficient to explain the introduction of significant 
universalizing reforms in market-heavy pension systems. Together, these three 
combinations of conditions cover every significant universalizing reform in market 
heavy pension systems in the past three decades, and they each do so with a solid 
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degree of consistency, meaning that there is little empirical evidence to contradict the 
statement of sufficiency set out in the solution formula. The statement of sufficiency 
is not logically contradicted by any cases. 
 
Table 2. Analysis of sufficient conditions for the outcome 'significant universalizing 
reform', intermediate solution 
Model: reform = f(hi_targ, lo_erel, lo_natsav, broad_fin, non_left). Intermediate solution. 
Frequency cut-off: 1.000000 Consistency cut-off: 0.755396. 
Cases in bold are uniquely covered by the relevant solution term. 
Assumptions: non_left (present); lo_natsav (present); lo_erel (present); hi_targ (present) 
 
The first combination of conditions sufficient to bring about significant universalizing 
reform in market-heavy systems consists of a non-left government, a low rate of 
national saving, the absence of a significant earnings-related pension, a reliance on 
targeting and general taxation financing. This combination of conditions uniquely 
covers the Danish reform of 1987 that loosened the income test for the pension 
supplement, the abolition of the affluence test in New Zealand in 1997, and the 
Australian reforms of 2000 and 2007 that loosened the means tests for the Age pension. 
No cases logically contradict the statement of sufficiency, and the consistency score is 
adequate at 0.768802.  
 
Solution 
hi_targ*  
lo_erel* 
lo_natsav*  
non_left 
+ 
hi_targ*  
lo_erel* 
~broad_fin*  
non_left 
+ 
hi_targ* 
lo_erel* 
lo_natsav* 
~broad_fin 
→ reform 
Single country 
coverage 
DEN80, NZ90, 
AUS00 
 
IRE80, IRE90, 
IRE00 
 
 
UK00 
 
  
 
Consistency 
 
0.768802 
 
 
0.702703 
 
 
0.748092 
  
Raw Coverage 0.413793  0.350825  0.146927   
Unique Coverage 0.367316  0.304348  0.100450   
Solution consistency: 0.785612; Solution coverage: 0.818591 
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I interpret this combination of conditions to be a manifestation of the ‘private savings’ 
logic of reform, in which a mismatch between the prevalence of means targeting and 
the prevalence of private savings means that large parts of the electorate are likely to 
have an interest in universalizing reform. In line with the expectation that in a time of 
austerity it will be difficult for left-of-centre governments to respond to this logic, the 
reforms in Denmark, New Zealand and Australia all occurred under non-left 
governments. Low rates of national saving were also present in all these reforms, 
supporting the idea that low national savings allow right-of-centre governments to 
legitimize a shift in focus, from fiscal restraint to the encouragement of private 
savings. 
 
Yet the solution term at the top of Table 2 suggests that the prevalence of targeting, of 
a non-left government, and of low national savings are not alone sufficient to explain 
universalizing reform in the market-heavy pension systems of Denmark, New 
Zealand and Australia. The absence of a significant earnings-related pension is also 
required. The UK case that follows offers an explanation as to why this may be the 
case.  
 
The second combination of conditions consists of a non-left government, the absence 
of a significant earnings-related pension, a reliance on targeting, and contribution 
rather than general taxation finance. It uniquely covers the Irish reforms that occurred 
in the 1980s, the 1990s, and the 2000s. Again, no cases logically contradict the 
statement of sufficiency, and the consistency score is passable at 0.702703. This ‘Irish 
path’ to universalizing reform reflects the exceptionalism of Irish pension politics 
since the 1980s.  
 
The third combination of conditions consists of the absence of a significant earnings-
related pension, a reliance on targeting, contribution rather than general taxation 
finance and a low rate of national saving. It uniquely covers the universalizing reforms 
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introduced by the UK in the 2000s, with a consistency score of 0.748092. Although the 
UK thus seemingly emerges from the analysis as an exceptional case of universalizing 
reform which occurred in the absence of a non-left government, the case study that 
follows show that the causal logic behind the UK reforms was in fact no different to 
that which drove the universalizing reforms in Australia, Denmark and New Zealand.   
Unlike statistical inference, in QCA, causal relationships are not assumed to be 
symmetric, so separate analysis is needed to explain negative or low values of the 
outcome of interest(Schneider & Wagemann, 2012). I therefore conduct a separate 
fsQCA for the non-reform outcome. The analysis shows a striking causal symmetry, 
and suggests that the ‘private savings’ logic explains not only the introduction of most 
universalizing reforms but also their absence. The results of the fsQCA of the non-
reform case are presented in the appendix.  
 
Aside from the Irish state pension reforms therefore, which were largely driven by a 
mismatch between targeting on the one hand and a contributory system from which 
large social groups were excluded on the other, the analysis in this section suggests 
that recent trends towards more universal state pensions can be explained by a single 
logic. This logic has at its root a mismatch between private pensions and targeting 
which leads to reform to make the state pension more universal when combined with 
the absence of a significant earnings-related pension, a low rate of national savings, 
and the presence of a non-left government. Despite the fact that QCA does not assume 
causal symmetry, this logic extends to explain why reform did not occur in most of 
those cases where it was absent.  
 
The next section examines the UK, which seemingly emerges from the QCA as a 
‘deviant’ case of universalizing reform. The case study offers further support for the 
idea that reputational politics are involved in universalizing reform. It further clarifies 
the ‘private savings’ logic, and examines why the absence of an earnings-related 
pension emerged from the QCA as part of this logic. 
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IV) United Kingdom: a deviant case of universalizing reform? 
 
In the 1980s, pension politics in the UK were contested in a rather straightforward 
way. The Conservative government wanted to shift responsibility for pension 
provision from the state to the market. The role of the state was to be confined to 
poverty relief through means-tested benefits, and earnings replacement was to be 
provided by private pensions (Saunders, 2007). Though the Conservatives did not 
succeed in abolishing the State Earnings Related Pension Scheme (SERPS) that 
supplemented the flat-rate contributory Basic State Pension (Hills, 1998), they 
responded to calls from employers and the pension industry by extending incentives 
to opt-out in favour of private schemes (Oude-Nijhuis, 2009; Pemberton, 2010).  
 
In addition, six years earlier the Conservative government had passed a less high 
profile reform of pension indexation, which was to erode the value of the state pension 
dramatically and to push people into means-tested benefits who otherwise would 
have received those benefits as a matter of contributory right. This was no side-effect 
of indexation. Rather, increased targeting was characteristic of the Conservative 
government’s broader welfare policy (Schulze & Moran, 2006b: 73).  
 
By contrast, throughout the 1980s the Labour party was strongly committed to 
contributory rather than means-tested benefits (Hills, 1998). It had taken the Labour 
Party over twenty years to introduce the SERPS in 1975, and the party was now 
fighting fiercely to retain the scheme. In its 1983 Manifesto, Labour not only promised 
to restore the earnings link but also promised to reverse the decline in the value of the 
basic state pension that had occurred since de-indexation. This commitment was 
repeated in the 1987 Manifesto, and Labour went to the 1992 general election 
promising to raise the top rate of tax and middle income national insurance 
contributions (Hills, 1998). Through a succession of electoral defeats, the Labour party 
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remained critical of the growth in the number claiming means-tested benefits, and 
insistent that the social security system should be based on the foundation of social 
insurance. 
 
New Labour’s new pension policy 
 
The Conservatives labelled the 1992 shadow budget ‘Labour’s tax bombshell’ and 
Labour lost the election. Although subsequent analyses of voting behaviour found 
little evidence Labour had been defeated on the basis of its plans for taxation, the 
message drawn by the new leadership was that Labour had to lose its tax and spend 
image (Driver, 2002). The Labour party conference in 1996 was a turning point in this 
direction. The party abandoned its commitment both to earnings uprating and to 
restoring the SERPS. By the time New Labour came to power in 1997 promising not 
to raise income tax and to stick to spending limits set by the Conservatives, it was no 
longer redistribution but rather poverty relief that was the party goal (Hills, 1998: 22). 
In line with this change in objectives, New Labour opted to increase the generosity of 
the means test rather than the basic state pension. Its first pension reform, the Welfare 
Reform and Pensions Act of 1999, reformed the means-tested pension. The new 
‘Minimum Income Guarantee’ was to be substantially more generous than its 
predecessor. Moreover, it would hold its position against average earnings while the 
value of the Basic State Pension, linked only to prices, continued to shrink. One year 
later, the Child Support, Pensions and Social Security Act replaced SERPS with the Second 
State Pension (S2P), moving the state gradually but definitively out of the business of 
earnings replacement and marking the unambiguous end of the Labour party's 
commitment to social insurance.   
 
These reforms faced fierce internal opposition, not only from traditionalists within the 
party (Driver, 2002), but also from party modernizers worried that they locked people 
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into poverty traps and had a morally damaging impact on behaviour (Castle & 
Townsend, 1996). But all attempts to shift the policy emphasis away from poverty 
relief were blocked on the grounds of cost (Field, 1995 in Driver, 2002: 95). Instead the 
Labour government tried to mitigate the disincentive effects of targeted benefits. The 
Child Support, Pensions and Social Security Act introduced for the first time an additional 
pension for carers and disabled people with broken work records, making it easier for 
these people to keep off the means test. And in 2002, the State Pension Credit Act 
replaced the Minimum Income Guarantee with the Pension Credit, which partially 
offset disincentives to save by rewarding people over 65 for their savings.  
 
Industry complaints lead to a new consensus 
 
Neither the Child Support, Pensions and Social Security Act nor the State Pension Credit 
Act reassured pension industry representatives, who were increasingly concerned 
about stagnating retirement savings. They began to lobby against means testing in 
favour of a more universal state pension, receipt of which would be less affected by 
private retirement savings. The National Association of Pension Funds (NAPF) was 
the first organization to propose reforms in this direction. The proposed reforms were 
radical. The NAPF wanted the various state pension strands combined to create a 
universal, non-contributory ‘citizen’s pension’ with eligibility based on a residency 
test (Hills, 1998: 20).  
 
The Labour government rejected the NAPF's proposal outright (Skypala, 2002). The 
opposition’s response however was much more accommodating. According to 
shadow Work and Pensions secretary David Willets, the Conservatives would back 
proposals for a single state pension sufficiently generous to take people off means 
tested benefits ‘if we were confident it commanded support from the occupational 
pension fund movement and employers’ (Timmins & Eaglesham, 2002). 
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Support from pension industry representatives was consolidated in early 2003 when 
the Association of British Insurers (ABI) 'joined the chorus of providers and analysts 
demanding changes to the state pension system to rescue the ailing private pension 
system’ (Willets, 2002). According to the ABI, the Pension Credit, which was to come 
into effect that year, would go to fifty-five per cent of the population and would 'leave 
many wondering why they should save’. The ABI aligned with the NAPF in calling 
for 'a simpler, less means-tested system' (Timmins, 2003). 
 
Three months after the ABI's statement, the Conservatives began to publicly advocate 
a more generous state pension, less reliant on means-testing, in order to restore private 
saving (Timmins, 2003; Financial Times, 2003). They proposed scrapping the S2P and 
providing in its place a Basic State Pension which would be 'much higher' than the 
Basic State Pension at the time, and ‘arguably higher’ than the means-tested pension 
(Financial Times, 2003). This would be done by restoring the link between the Basic 
State Pension and average earnings that was broken in 1980 (Timmins & Newman, 
2003; Timmins & Turner, 2003).  
 
The Conservative party's new policy stance was a clear move away from Thatcherite 
attempts to residualize the state pension. Cost concerns from traditionalists within the 
party were pushed aside (Timmins & Turner, 2003), as were the reservations of 
employers, who were stalling for time. The Confederation of British Industry (CBI) 
accepted that the Basic State Pension needed to be strengthened, but insisted that this 
should not start to happen until 2020. Speaking to the press, Willets dismissed the 
CBI's concerns, insisting: ‘we need to start increasing the Basic State Pension as soon 
as possible to begin to get people off means-tested benefits’ (Timmins & Newman, 
2003). 
 
The Conservative's pledge to reduce the need for means-testing by restoring the 
earnings link to the Basic State Pension ensured that pension saving was 'set to be a 
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main issue in the general election' (Timmins, 2004b). Faced with the Conservative's 
pledge to expand the state pension, the Labour party began to rethink its policy stance. 
In September 2004, the Financial Times reported that after three years of denying the 
disincentive effects of their pension policies, ‘the government is acknowledging that 
its critics have a point’ (Hall, 2004). In his party conference speech, the Prime Minister 
announced that in a third term Labour would redesign the state system, putting more 
money into pensions while ensuring that the non means-tested basic pension was ‘at 
the core’ of the redesign (Timmins, 2004a).  
 
An extensive consultation by the Pension Commission highlighted an emerging 
consensus that means testing had damaged disincentives to save and ought to be 
lessened (Timmins, 2004a). The consultation formed the basis of the Commission’s 
second report, which recommended reforms to make the state system less means-
tested and closer to universal (Giles, 2004; Pensions Commission, 2005a: 26).  
 
In 2006 the Government published its own proposals in a White Paper that closely 
followed the proposals of the Pensions Commission. The White Paper proposed to 
uprate the Basic State Pension to average earnings and loosen eligibility conditions for 
both the Basic State Pension and the S2P (Pensions Commission, 2005b). When the 
proposals were brought before parliament in the form of the 2007 Pension Act, they 
received cross-party support. 
 
Although the UK had not fully turned its back on the contributory principle, it had 
taken the biggest step towards universalism in over thirty years. The reforms were 
introduced by Labour and for this reason the UK emerges from the fsQCA as a deviant 
case of reform. However, the preceding narrative shows that it was not Labour but 
rather the Conservatives that played the crucial role in the introduction of 
universalizing reforms. It was the dramatic shift in policy stance of the Conservative 
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opposition that forced New Labour to rethink the strategy of targeting that it had 
adopted less than a decade previously.  
 
The private savings logic of reform in the UK 
 
As in the Australian case, pension industry representatives shaped the development 
of the Conservative’s new policy stance. Citing concern about the negative effect that 
increased means-testing was having on incentives to save privately for retirement, 
both the ABI and the NAPF pushed decisively for a more universal state pension. 
Despite employer ambivalence, the Conservatives responded by adopting the 
language of ‘incentives to save’ to justify their first universalizing policy proposal in 
living memory. The Labour party had been promoting targeted benefits as part of a 
show of fiscal rectitude, and was initially reluctant to change policy stance. It did so 
only after the idea was put forward publicly by the opposition and legitimized as a 
consensus through the expert work of the Pensions Commission.   
 
What caused pension industry representatives to react when they did? By the 2000s, 
means-testing had increased as a result of both Conservative and Labour policies, and 
was set to increase further if no changes were made. Yet it is unlikely that this increase 
in means-testing was alone the reason that the NAPF and the ABI began to call for a 
more universal state pension. Though the role of means-testing had increased, it had 
always been prevalent in the UK pension system. As the calibration data in the 
appendix shows, means-testing was above the OECD average not only in the 2000s, 
but also in the 1990s and the 1980s.  
 
The narrative shows that in addition to increasing the prevalence of means-testing, 
successive Conservative and Labour policies since the 1980s also eroded the SERPS. 
Before the SERPS was eroded, pension industry representatives were focused on 
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minimizing the crowding-out of private saving by protecting and extending National 
Insurance rebates and the ‘opt-out’. As SERPS declined, their attention shifted to how 
means-testing was creating disincentives to save.  
 
Although there is insufficient variation in the UK case to ‘isolate’ the effects of the 
increase in means-testing and the declining significance of the earnings-related 
pension, the idea that means-testing becomes salient for pension industry 
representatives only in the absence of an earnings-related pension that crowded-out 
private saving is supported by the fsQCA results, where the absence of a significant 
earnings-related pension is associated without exception with universalizing reform, 
while the presence of a significant earnings-related pension is associated without 
exception with the absence of such reform. 
 
 
Conclusion   
 
With the exception of Ireland, where early reforms to make the state pension more 
universal stemmed from a mismatch between targeting and a contributory system 
with restricted coverage, the fsQCA presented in this paper shows that every reform 
that made the state pension more universal in market-heavy pension systems since 
1980 had at its root a mismatch between a reliance on private pensions and a reliance 
on targeting.  
 
Contrary to established institutionalist logics, private insurance and targeting do not 
necessarily shape political preferences such that the state pension becomes more 
residual over time. Rather, where the prevalence of means testing and the prevalence 
of private pensions coexist, this can lead to a less residual state pension with looser 
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eligibility conditions and more people receiving the state pension as a matter of 
contributory right. 
 
Prevalent means-testing led representatives of the pension industry in market-heavy 
systems to develop an interest in universalizing reforms that could reduce 
disincentives to save for retirement. And unlike employers whose ambivalence 
regarding universalizing reform was sidelined, the pension industry was influential 
in bringing about reform. This pattern of interest group influence can be understood 
in light of the fact that pension industry representatives did not succeed in the 
introduction of universalizing reforms by lobbying. Rather they achieved their aims 
because they influenced the electoral strategies of right-of-centre parties, using their 
expertise to identify, develop and communicate policies that were then adopted by 
these parties as being in their electoral interest.  
 
The electoral interest of political parties was shaped by reputation and reflected a 
Nixon-goes-to-China logic. In both Australia and the UK, left-of-centre parties were 
primarily concerned with proving their fiscal rectitude to the electorate. They targeted 
state benefits more tightly on the needy, and supplemented targeted state provision 
with the regulatory extension of private pensions. By contrast, right-of-centre parties 
in both countries had built up strong reputations for macro-economic management. 
They were able to propose fiscally costly yet electorally popular universalizing 
reforms that benefited those who had saved privately for retirement and whose 
eligibility to state pension entitlements was to be reduced as a result.  
 
The analysis in this paper thus reveals a systematic relationship between political 
parties and reforms that make the state pension more universal. Yet contrary to the 
stylized picture that means-testing is driven by the secular right and universal state 
pensions by the left, the universalizing expansion of state pensions in the post-
industrial context has been driven by non-left parties. Even in the seemingly deviant 
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case of the UK, the Conservatives played a crucial role in the reform process. 
 
The idea that targeting and private provision erode political support for state benefits 
features prominently among institutionalist understandings of welfare state change. 
By showing that the combination of targeting and private pensions can generate 
pressure for reforms that make the state pension more universal, and spelling out the 
conditions under which this pressure leads to universalizing reform, this paper 
develops a more nuanced understanding of how the increasingly prevalent 
institutional patterns of targeting and private provision interact to shape pension 
politics. 
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Appendix 
 
Table A1. Ratios of private to public pension expenditure for all OECD countries  
OECD Pensions at a Glance 2013 OECD Factbook 2013 
Country 2005 Country 2009 Country 2005 Country 2009 
  Iceland 2.13 Iceland 1.70 Iceland 3.76 
Iceland 1.42 Netherlands 1.10 Australia 1.12 Australia 1.31 
Netherlands 1.06 Switzerland 0.92 Switzerland 0.78 Netherlands 0.76 
Canada 1.03 Canada 0.81 Netherlands 0.70 Denmark 0.70 
Switzerland 0.89 
United 
Kingdom 
0.74 Denmark 0.63 Canada 0.60 
United 
Kingdom 
0.86 Australia 0.59 
United 
Kingdom 
0.54 Korea 0.52 
United States 0.63 
United 
States 
0.57 Korea 0.53 
United 
Kingdom 
0.52 
Australia 0.56 Denmark 0.40 Canada 0.49 United States 0.43 
Denmark 0.41 Chile 0.38 United States 0.48 New Zealand 0.40 
Sweden 0.28 Japan 0.30 Israel 0.33 Chile 0.37 
Ireland 0.25 Sweden 0.30 New Zealand 0.30 Israel 0.34 
Chile 0.22 Ireland 0.21 Norway 0.29 Belgium 0.33 
OECD 0.21 OECD 0.21 OECD 0.24 OECD 0.28 
Belgium 0.17 Belgium 0.14 Belgium 0.14 Mexico 0.23 
Norway 0.12 Norway 0.12 Sweden 0.13 Sweden 0.16 
Italy 0.10 Italy 0.10 Portugal 0.09 Portugal 0.08 
Luxembourg 0.08 Germany 0.08 Mexico 0.08 Finland 0.07 
Germany 0.07 Luxembourg 0.07 Spain 0.06 Spain 0.06 
Slovak 
Republic 
0.07 
Czech 
Republic 
0.06 Hungary 0.02 
Czech 
Republic 
0.05 
Portugal 0.06 Austria 0.05 Austria 0.02 France 0.03 
Austria 0.04 Portugal 0.04 Italy 0.01 Germany 0.03 
Greece 0.04 
Slovak 
Republic 
0.04 Luxembourg 0.01 Hungary 0.02 
Czech Republic 0.04 Greece 0.03 Germany 0.01 Austria 0.01 
Finland 0.03 Finland 0.03 Poland 0.00 Turkey 0.01 
France 0.03 France 0.02 Turkey 0.00 Italy 0.01 
Korea 0.00 Korea 0.00   Luxembourg 0.01 
      Estonia 0.00 
      Greece 0.00 
      Poland 0.00 
      Slovenia 0.00 
Missing data: OECD Factbook 2013 has missing data for Chile 2005; Czech Republic 2005; Estonia 
2005; Finland 2005; France 2005; Greece 2005; Ireland 2005, 2009; Japan 2005, 2009; Norway 
2009; Slovak Republic 2005, 2009; Slovenia 2005; Switzerland 2009. OECD Pensions at a Glance 
2013 has missing data for Estonia 2005, 2009; Hungary 2005, 2009; Israel 2005, 2009; Japan 
2005; Mexico 2005, 2009; New Zealand 2005, 2009; Poland 2005, 2009; Slovenia 2005, 2009; 
Spain 2005, 2009; Turkey 2005, 2009. 
 
Two OECD datasets provide figures for expenditure on private and public pension 
benefits as a percentage of GDP (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
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Development, 2013a, 2013b). The two datasets vary slightly in the private pension 
expenditure that they report. Since no clear reason is given for the differences in 
recorded private pension expenditure, I make use of both sources to identify my 
universe of cases. The table above expresses the data from each source as a ratio of 
private to public pension expenditure, for the two years for which both sets of 
information are available. For the purposes of this paper, the universe of market-
heavy pension systems consists of those countries that on the basis of the available 
data have a ratio of private to public pension expenditure that is consistently higher 
than the OECD average. I therefore exclude Sweden, Norway and Belgium, in which 
the ratio of private to public expenditure is higher than the OECD average in only one 
of the two datasets, and Japan, where only one data point is available. 
 
Table A2. Reforms to the state pension affecting universalism 
Although some databases of pension reforms do exist, they are few and are not sufficiently 
detailed to develop an understanding of reforms affecting universalism1. The following list of 
reforms has therefore been compiled by drawing on secondary sources, government reports, and 
the International Social Security Association (ISSA) reform database.  
Country  Year Description of reform Name of reform 
Australia  1983 
Means testing tightened- 
tightened income testing of 
pensions for those aged over 
seventy 
Social Security and 
Repatriation 
Legislation 
Amendment Act 
Australia  1984 
Means testing tightened- assets 
test re-introduced and either 
income or assets test to be 
applied, depending on which test 
gives lower pension level. 
Social Security and 
Repatriation 
(Budget Measures 
and Assets Test) Act 
Australia  2000 
Means testing loosened- 
reduced the asset and income 
taper test rates from 50% to 40%. 
Increased the income and asset 
test ‘free’ areas by 2.5% 
 
Australia  2007 
Means testing loosened- halved 
the assets test taper rate to 
increase incentives to save. The 
assets test threshold was raised 
from $343,750 to $529,250. 
Tax Laws 
Amendment 
(Simplified 
Superannuation) Act 
2007 
     
Canada  1989 
Affluence test introduced- 
introduced OAS ‘clawback’ from 
high income pensioners 
 
Canada  1997 
Shift towards targeting- 
Pensions to be calculated on the 5-
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year average of the Year’s 
Maximum Pensionable Earnings 
instead of the 3-year average 
     
Denmark  1987 
Means testing loosened- 
loosened the income test for the 
Pension Supplement. More people 
entitled to the full means-tested 
benefit 
Lettelese af 
Samspilsproblemer 
Denmark  1993 
Shift towards targeting- 
reduction of basic pension, and 
increase in Pension Supplement 
by equal amount. 
Konsekvenser af 
skattereform 
Denmark  1996 
Contribution credits- recipients 
of sickness, maternity and 
unemployment benefits received 
twice the normal ATP 
contribution 
Dobbelt ATP for folk 
pa 
overforselsindkoms
ter 
Denmark  2003 
Shift towards targeting- 
introduction of the ‘elderly check’, 
a tightly targeted benefit paid only 
to pensioners with no income 
aside from the state pension.  
Budget  
     
Ireland  1988 
Coverage of state pension 
extended- introduced 
compulsory PRSI for the self-
employed 
Social Welfare Act 
Ireland  1991 
Coverage of state pension 
extended- introduced 
compulsory PRSI for the part-time 
workers 
 
Ireland  1994 
Coverage of state pension 
extended- up to twenty years 
spent caring for children or 
incapacitated adults to be 
disregarded when averaging the 
social insurance record  
Homemakers’ 
Scheme 
Ireland  1997 
Eligibility conditions for state 
pension tightened- increased the 
minimum contributions required 
for eligibility to the Old Age 
(Contributory) State pension 
Social Welfare Act 
Ireland  2006 
Means testing loosened- 
increased the means test 
disregard from EUR 7.60 per week 
to EUR 20.00 
Social Welfare Law 
Reform and 
Pensions Act 
     
New Zealand  1985 
Affluence test introduced- 
introduced the taxation Surcharge 
 
New Zealand  1990 
Affluence test increased- 
taxation surcharge rate increased 
from 20-25% 
 
New Zealand  1997 Affluence test abolished- Taxation 
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surcharge abolished entirely, 
leaving universal pension with no 
form of targeting 
(Superannuitant 
Surcharge 
Abolition) Act 
     
Switzerland  1985 
Means testing tightened- 
lowering of complementary 
benefits for pensioners with own 
savings 
Zweite Revision des 
Bundesgesetzes 
uber 
Erganzungsleistung
en zur AHV/IV 
Switzerland  2003 
Shift towards targeting- 
cutbacks in pension indexation 
11th AHV/AVS 
revision 
     
United Kingdom  1980 
Shift towards targeting- 
pensions no longer uprated by the 
better of earnings or prices, but by 
prices only 
Social Security Act 
United Kingdom  1999 
Shift towards targeting- 
renamed the main means-tested 
pension ‘Minimum Income 
Guarantee’. Increased its 
generosity substantially and 
temporarily indexed it to earnings 
rather than prices. 
Welfare Reform and 
Pensions Act 
United Kingdom  2000 
Contribution credits- 
introduced credits for carers and 
disabled people with broken work 
records to enable them to build up 
entitlements to the state pension 
 
United Kingdom  2002 
Means testing loosened- 
replaced the Minimum Income 
Guarantee with the Pension 
Credit. The Pension Credit system 
offset some of the disincentive 
effects of the means-tested 
Minimum Income Guarantee by 
introducing a Savings Credit 
element to reward people over 65 
for their savings. 
State Pension Credit 
Act 
United Kingdom  2007 
Eligibility conditions for state 
pension loosened and a shift 
away from targeting- loosened 
eligibility conditions for receipt of 
the Basic State Pension 
Re-introduced earnings uprating 
 
Pensions Act 
United States  1981 
Means testing tightened- 
instead of the first $60 of earned 
or unearned income being 
excluded, now the first $20 were 
excluded, and instead of the next 
$195 of the remainder of 
quarterly earned income being 
excluded, now the next $65 was 
excluded 
Public Law 97-35 
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United States  
1993 
1996 
Means testing tightened- placed 
restrictions on DI and SSI benefits 
to Drug Addicts and Alcoholics 
1993 and 1996 SSA 
Amendment Acts 
 
 
Measurement and Calibration of Outcomes and Causal Conditions 
 
Measurement and calibration of the reform outcome 
 
The outcome of interest is the presence of universalising reform. For each country-
decade, I calibrate membership in the fuzzy-set ‘reform’ according to how much any 
needs-based or contributory arrangements restrict coverage. To do this I draw on my 
own database of reforms (see Appendix B), as well as on a range of government 
reports and secondary sources, and construct a four value fuzzy-set, the coding 
scheme for which is presented in Table C1 below. 
 
Table A3. Coding scheme for the reform outcome 
Fuzzy-set score 
Membership in the set of cases that have 
experienced significant universalising reform 
1 fully in 
0.67 more in than out 
0.33 more out than in 
0 fully out 
 
Such a method of calibration is ‘especially useful in situations where researchers have 
a substantial amount of information about cases, but the nature of the evidence is not 
identical across cases’ (Ragin, 2009: 90). The calibration of the reform outcome is 
explained in detail for each country-decade in Box 1 below. The calibrated conditions 
are then summarized in Table C5. 
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Box 1: Calibration of the reform outcome ‘reform’ 
 
Australia-1980 (AUS80), Australia-1990 (AUS90) and Australia-2000 (AUS00) 
 
The state pension in Australia consists solely of the means-tested Age Pension. Reforms in 1983 
and 1985 tightened the means-testing of the Age Pension, decreasing its coverage. The country-
decade of AUS80 therefore lies ‘fully out’ of the set ‘significant universalising reform’.  
There were no reforms that affected the universalism of the Australian state pension in the 1990s. 
The country-decade of AUS90 therefore lies ‘fully out’ of the set ‘significant universalising reform’. 
The trend since has been reversed. In 2000 the asset and income taper test rates were reduced 
from 50% to 40%, and the income and asset test ‘free’ areas were increased by 2.5%. Though I 
have not been able to find an impact assessment that directly estimates the impact of this policy 
on Age Pension coverage, from research estimating the impact of a similar policy change it is 
possible to infer that around 2% of seniors would be newly eligible for the Age Pension after this 
change (S. Kelly, 2009: 24). In 2007 the assets test taper rate was halved, and the assets test 
threshold was raised from $343,750 to $529,250. This resulted in an estimated 300,000 extra 
seniors becoming eligible to receive the Age Pension, or 8% of those who were over 60 at the time 
of the reform (Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2009: 40; Nielson & Harris, 2010; Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development, Various Years). Since in Australia two universalising 
reforms were introduced in the 2000s which together extended coverage significantly, I consider 
the country-decade AUS00 to be ‘fully in’ the set ‘significant universalising reform’. 
 
Canada-1980 (CAN80), Canada-1990 (CAN90) and Canada-2000 (CAN00) 
The Canadian state pension consists of a) the basic Old Age Security (OAS) pension which is based 
on residence and subject to an income test or ‘claw-back’ operated through the tax system, b) the 
Guaranteed Income Supplement (GIS) which is a means-tested supplement to the basic OAS 
pension, and c) the Canada Pension Plan (CPP) which is an earnings-related supplement to the 
OAS.  
In the three decades under consideration Canada implemented two reforms, both of which 
increased the targeting of the state pension. Canada introduced an affluence test in 1989 to ‘claw 
back’ OAS benefits from high income pensioners, and a change to the benefit formula of the 
earnings-related CPP scaled back contributory benefits and in this way constituted a shift towards 
targeting. The country-decades of CAN80 and CAN90 and CAN00 therefore all lie ‘fully out’ of the set 
‘significant universalising reform’. 
 
Denmark-1980 (DEN80), Denmark-1990 (DEN90) and Denmark-2000 (DEN00) 
The Danish state pension consists of a) the basic National Pension (Folkepension), which is flat-
rate and based on citizenship, b) the working-hours related Arbejdsmarkedets Tillaegspension or 
ATP and income-related Særlige Pensionsopsparing or Special Pension (SP), and c) the income-
tested Pension Supplement1. 
In 1987 Denmark loosened the income test for the Pension Supplement. By the time this change 
was fully implemented, in 1993, the number of pensioners who received the income tested 
supplement had risen by 15% (the number of pensioners who received the full supplement rose 
from 48% in 1987 to 69% in 1993, whereas the number who received the reduced supplement 
decreased from 18% to 12%) (Green-Pedersen, 2000: 75-76). On the basis of this reform, I 
consider the country-decade of DEN80 to lie ‘fully in’ the set ‘significant universalising reform’. 
The country shifted towards targeting in 1993 when it passed a reform that reduced the Basic 
Pension and increased the Pension Supplement by the same amount. This reform had the effect 
of increasing the relative importance of the Pension Supplement relative to the Basic Pension. 
Over time, as occupational pension schemes introduced through collective agreements in 1991 
mature, fewer people will be entitled to the Pension Supplement. As a result ‘for the system in 
general the change made in 1993 was a step away from universalism’ (Green-Pedersen, 2003: 
12).  
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However, in 1996, Denmark passed a reform extending ATP contributions to cover those on 
sickness, maternity, and unemployment benefits for the first time (Green-Pedersen, 2006: 484- 
486). This extension of ATP coverage to these individuals was a significant universalising reform. 
Taking into account the two reforms, and on the basis of qualitative assessments of the Danish 
case (Green-Pedersen, 2003) I consider the country-decade DEN90 to lie ‘more out than in’ the set 
of cases which have experienced significant universalising reform. 
In 2003, Denmark introduced the ‘elderly check’, a tightly targeted benefit paid only to pensioners 
with no income aside from the state pension (Green-Pedersen, 2003, 2006). On the basis of this 
reform and in the absence of any universalising reforms in this decade, I consider the country-
decade of DEN00 to lie ‘fully out’ of the set ‘significant universalising reform’. 
 
Ireland-1980 (IRE80), Ireland-1990 (IRE90) and Ireland-2000 (IRE00) 
The Irish state pension consists of the State Pension (Contributory), which is a flat-rate pension 
based on social insurance (PRSI) contributions, and a means-tested safety net in the form of the 
State Pension (Non-Contributory).   
In 1988, Ireland extended the coverage of the contributory state pension significantly, by 
introducing compulsory PRSI for the self-employed for the first time. It is on the basis of 
compulsory PRSI contributions to the Social Insurance Fund that contributors become eligible for 
the contributory state pension. This extended coverage by 10-12% of the workforce in the three 
years immediately following the reform. Of these self-employed people who were newly covered, 
many are expected to build up sufficient contributions to make them eligible for the contributory 
state pension (IHRC, 2006: 21) and I therefore consider the country-decade AUS00 to be ‘fully in’ 
the set ‘significant universalising reform’. 
In 1991 the coverage of the contributory state pension was increased further with the inclusion 
of part-time workers into the Social Insurance Fund. This was a significant increase. At the time 
of the reform, part-time workers in Ireland made up around 9% of the total, and a large number 
of these can be expected to build up enough PRSI contributions to be eligible for the contributory 
state pension. Moreover, part-time work has since become more common - ten years after the 
reform, part-time workers in Ireland made up 16% of the total (European Foundation for the 
Improvement of Living and Working Conditions, 2007: 3). In 1994 the coverage of the 
contributory state pension was further extended with the introduction of the Homemakers’ 
Scheme. As a result of this reform, up to twenty years spent caring for children or incapacitated 
adults would now be disregarded when a person’s social insurance record was averaged for 
contributory purposes. The extension of coverage that resulted from this reform was of smaller 
magnitude to the reforms of 1988 and 1991- a total of 15,034 people registered for the scheme 
between its introduction in 1994 and 2007. Since other qualifying conditions still apply, many 
but not all of those registered for the scheme will build up eligibility for a contributory state 
pension (2007). In 1997, Ireland passed a reform increasing the minimum contributions required 
for eligibility to the Old Age (Contributory) State Pension. Although this reform was significant 
and cannot be ignored, the overall trend remains that of an increase in the number of people 
qualifying for pensions based on their social insurance record rather than through means testing 
(Cliath, 2007: 58-59). To reflect this I place the country-decade IRE90 ‘more in than out’ of the set 
of cases which have experienced significant universalising reform. 
In 2006 Ireland moved towards universalism again when it increased the means test disregard 
from EUR 7.60 to EUR 20.00 per week. This reform was estimated to ‘lift some 34,000 pensioners 
onto higher or full pensions’ (2006). This is equivalent to extending the coverage of the non-
contributory state pension by around 5% of the over 60s (own calculation, (Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development, Various Years)). I therefore consider the country-
decade IRE00 to lie ‘more in than out’ of the set of cases which have experienced significant 
universalising reform. 
 
Netherlands-1980 (NET80), Netherlands-1990 (NET90) and Netherlands-2000 (NET00) 
The Dutch state pension consists solely of the Algemene Ouderdomswet (AOW), which is flat-rate 
and based on residence. In the Netherlands, there were no reforms that affected the universalism 
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of the state pension at all in the period under consideration. The country-decades of NET80 NET90 
and NET00 therefore lie ‘fully out’ of the set ‘significant universalising reform’. 
 
New Zealand-1980 (NZ80), New Zealand-1990 (NZ90) and New Zealand-2000 (NZ00) 
The state pension in New Zealand is called New Zealand Superannuation, and is flat-rate and based 
on residence. New Zealand moved away from universalism in 1986 when it introduced the 
Superannuation Surcharge, an affluence test affecting 23% of superannuitants. The country-
decade of NZ80 therefore lies ‘fully out’ of the set ‘significant universalising reform’. 
After a small increase in the affluence test from 20% to 25% in 1990, the Superannuation 
Surcharge was abolished completely in 1997, leaving a universal flat-rate state pension 
conditional only on residence. The country-decade of NZ90 therefore lies ‘fully in’ of the set 
‘significant universalising reform’ 
Having experienced no reforms that affected the universalism of its pension system in the 2000s, 
the country-decade of NZ80 therefore lies ‘fully out’ of the set ‘significant universalising reform’. 
 
Switzerland-1980 (SWI80), Switzerland-1990 (SWI90) and Switzerland-2000 (SWI00) 
The Swiss state pension consists of a) the Alters- und Hinterlassenenversicherung/Assurance 
Vieillesse et Survivants (AHV/AVS) which is earnings-related and based on social insurance 
contributions, and b) an income-tested pension supplement called the 
Ergänzungsleistungen/Prestations Complémentaires (EL-PC).  
Switzerland tightened the means test in 1985, lowering complementary benefits for pensioners 
with their own savings. The country-decade of SWI80 therefore lies ‘fully out’ of the set ‘significant 
universalising reform’. 
In the 1990s there were no reforms affecting the universalism of the state pension in Switzerland.  
On this basis, I consider the country-decade SWI90 to lie ‘fully out’ of the set of cases which have 
experienced significant universalising reform.  
Switzerland shifted towards targeting in 2003 when it introduced cutbacks in pension indexation.  
The country-decade of SWI00 therefore lies ‘fully out’ of the set ‘significant universalising reform’. 
 
United Kingdom-1980 (UK80), United Kingdom-1990 (UK90) and United Kingdom-2000 
(UK00) 
The state pension in the UK consists of a) the Basic State Pension, which is flat-rate and based on 
social insurance contributions, a) the State Earnings Related Pension (SERPS) or Second State 
Pension (SSP) which is earnings-related and subject to an opt-out clause, and c) an income-tested 
supplement (Minimum Income Guarantee or Pension Credit) 
The UK shifted away from universalism in the 1980s when it moved from earnings to price 
indexation of the state pension, and again in the 1990s when it increased the generosity of the 
Minimum Income Guarantee. The country-decades UK80 and UK90 therefore lie ‘fully out’ of the set 
‘significant universalising reform’ 
In 2000s, the UK made three significant reforms increasing the universalism of the state pension. 
In 2000, it introduced credits for carers and disabled people with broken work records to enable 
them to build up entitlements to the state pension. Then in 2002, it loosened the means test. The 
Minimum Income Guarantee which was withdrawn at a rate of 100% as outside income 
increased, was replaced by the Pension Credit which was to be withdrawn at a rate of 40 % 
(Emmerson & Disney, 2005: 75). This inevitably increased the number of individuals who are 
eligible. Moreover, because the Act indexed the Pension Credit to prices while the Basic State 
Pension remained indexed to earnings (temporarily, but with the aspiration to make this 
permanent) eligibility to the Pension Credit was expected to increase more over time. Using the 
IFS tax and benefit model, and detailed information on incomes from the 2002-03 Family 
Resources Survey, Emmerson and Disney estimated that the number of individuals in families 
containing an individual aged 65 or over eligible for the Pension Credit would increase in the first 
instance by around 18.4% (from 27.4% of individuals to 45.8% of individuals) in 2004-5, and 
subsequently to 71.1% of individuals by 2050-51 (an increase of 43.7%) as a result of the 
reduction of the withdrawal rate to 40% (Emmerson & Disney, 2004: 33). Estimates published 
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by the DWP using a similar model but assuming that real earnings growth would only average 
1½% a year suggested that entitlement will increase by 15%, from 50% in 2002 to 65% in 2050 
(DWP, 2002). On either estimate, this reform increased eligibility to state benefits substantially, 
however it did so by extending eligibility to means-tested benefits whilst eligibility to the basic 
state pension remained unaltered. It extended coverage of the state pension, but in doing so it 
increased the role of means tested benefits relative to non means-tested benefits. 
In 2007 the UK re-introduced earnings uprating, and loosened the eligibility conditions for 
receipt of the basic state pension, most notably by reducing the number of qualifying years 
needed for a full basic State Pension to 30 (from 44 for men and 39 for women). The immediate 
effect of this reform (as of its implementation in 2010) was to increase the number of women 
retiring on a full basic State Pension by around 20% - from around 70 % of those reaching State 
Pension age in 2010 instead of around 50 % without reform (DWP, 2006: 108). In the long run, 
as the effects of earnings uprating kick in, the combined impact of the reforms to the structure 
and coverage of the State Pension will be ‘a considerable reduction in the number of people whose 
entitlements will be means-tested in the future’ compared to what would have happened in the 
absence of reform. The DWP estimated that under current policies projected forward, around 70 
% of pensioner households will be entitled to some Pension Credit by 2050. As a result of the 
2007 reforms, that figure will be reduced to around 30 %, i.e. a 40% decrease (DWP, 2006: 122-
123). The Pensions Policy Institute agreed that the state pension reforms introduced in the 
Pensions Act 2007 were likely to mean “a large fall in future Pension Credit eligibility” compared 
to what would have happened in the absence of reform. The Pensions Policy Institute provided 
an estimated range of possible Pension Credit entitlements in 2050, from 25% to 55%. Under its 
central scenario, eligibility is projected to fall slightly less, to 40% in 2050 (Pensions Policy 
Institute, 2007). As a result of the 2007 reform therefore, these individuals are no longer eligible 
for the Pension Credit, because they are eligible for the basic state pension instead. So, in addition 
to the immediate effects on pension entitlement, the Pension Act of 2007 increases pension 
coverage as a social right substantially in the long term compared to what would have happened 
in the absence of reform, but also (if we remember that in 2004-05 around 45.8% individuals 
were entitled to the pension credit (Emmerson & Disney, 2004: 33)) compared to what the 
situation was just prior to the reform. To reflect these reforms, I therefore place the country-
decade UK00 ‘fully in’ the set ‘significant universalising reform’. 
 
United States-1980 (US80), United States-1990 (US90) and United States-2000 (US00) 
In the United States the state pension consists of a) Social Security, which is earnings-related and 
based on social insurance contributions, and b) the Supplementary Security Income, a means-
tested supplement. 
In the US universalism decreased incrementally throughout the 1980s and 1990s. There were no 
universalising reforms in the period under consideration. Instead, the means-test was tightened 
in 1981, and certain categories of people (drug addicts and alcoholics) were excluded from the 
minimum pension in 1993 and 1996. I therefore place the country-decades US80, US90 and US00 
‘fully out’ of the set ‘significant universalising reform’. 
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Membership and calibration of causal conditions 
 
A reliance on targeting (hi_targ) 
 
I expect that the prevalence of means testing may lead to key political actors having 
an interest in universalizing reform, stemming either from a mismatch between 
contribution financing and means-testing, or from a mismatch between the prevalence 
of means-testing and private savings. The first condition that I include in my analysis 
therefore aims to capture the reform pressures that targeting can generate.  
 
For each country-decade, I calibrate membership in the crisp-set ‘hi_targ’ according to 
how prevalent means testing is. I draw on a range of government reports and 
secondary sources and collect data on the proportion of elderly either receiving 
means-tested benefits or affected by an affluence test. However, since reliance on 
means-testing is a classic characteristic of ‘Liberal’ welfare regimes which are over-
represented in my universe of cases, relying on this data alone is likely to be a poor 
guide to defining what constitutes prevalent means testing.  
 
I therefore calibrate the condition hi_targ using criteria for set membership that are 
external to this data. In particular, I used OECD data on the ‘percentage of over 65s 
receiving a targeted pension’ and took the mean of 15% as the threshold for 
membership in the set of countries where means-testing is prevalent. Although this 
data is not available in time-series and refers to ‘the most recent year available’ in 2011, 
it suffices to place my cases within the conceptual set of ‘cases where means-testing is 
prevalent’. I create a crisp rather than a fuzzy set, and use the 15% threshold to 
dichotomize my data on means-tested benefit recipiency. As a robustness check, I also 
calibrate the data to create a fuzzy set, using the direct method of calibration with 15 
as the 0.5 anchor, and the 0 and 1 anchors at 6 and 65 respectively - guided by 
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prominent gaps in the data. Again, the decision to place the UK80 above or below the 
0.5 anchor makes no difference to the result, and as expected, the solution term 
remained the same when using the fuzzy set version of this condition. The data behind 
of the condition hi_targ is set out in detail for each country-decade in Box 2 below. 
Both the data and the resulting calibration scores are summarized in Table C2. 
 
Box 2: Calibration of the condition hi-targ  
 
Australia-1980 (AUS80), Australia-1990 (AUS90) and Australia-2000 (AUS00) 
The Australian Age Pension starts to be reduced once annual income from other sources exceeds 
a threshold known as the “free area”. The amounts for 2008 were AU$132 in the first half and 
AU$138 in the second half of the year (calculated fortnightly). Almost 44 per cent of all pensioners 
have their benefits reduced by the means tests and therefore receive a part-rate Age Pension. 
Within this group 82 per cent are income tested and 18 per cent are assets tested. Just over 56 
per cent of pensioners receive the maximum Age Pension (Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development, 2011).  
According to the Welfare Entitlements Data Set, the proportion of those above statutory 
retirement age in receipt of the state pension in Australia is very high, though it has declined a 
little over the past three decades from 78 per cent in the 1980s, to 70 per cent in the 1990s, and 
to 67 percent in the 2000s (Lyle Scruggs, 2004). Combining data on Age Pension recipients 
published by the Australian Department of Parliamentary Services with OECD population data 
tells a similar story, with the proportion of Age Pension recipients declining from 84 per cent of 
the over 65s in the 1980s to 73 per cent in the 1990s and 2000s (Daniels, 2011). For 
comparability with my other cases, I use the Australian and OECD data as the basis for my 
analysis, though this choice makes no difference to the results.  
 
Canada-1980 (CAN80), Canada-1990 (CAN90) and Canada-2000 (CAN00) 
In Canada the basic Old Age Security (OAS) is subject to an income test or ‘claw-back’. For income 
above CA$66,733 a year, the basic pension in 2010 was withdrawn at a 15 per cent rate, and the 
benefit was phased out completely for incomes over CA$108,000. In the two decades since it was 
introduced 1989, the claw-back has affected a steady 5 per cent of OAS recipients (Canadian 
Department of Finance, 2010). 
The Guaranteed Income Supplement (GIS) is Canada’s means tested supplement to the basic OAS 
pension, and is reduced against all income other than the basic OAS pension at a 50 percent rate 
(Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 2011). The Office of the Chief 
Actuary in Canada publishes annually an Actuarial Report on the Old Age Security System. These 
reports publish the number of GIS beneficiaries, and, in combination with OECD population data 
(Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Various Years) it is therefore 
possible to calculate the proportion of over 65s receiving GIS benefits (Office of the Chief Actuary, 
Various Years). This data shows that the prevalence of GIS benefits has declined slightly over the 
three decades since 1980, averaging 34 per cent of the over 65s in the 1980s, 29 per cent in the 
90s, and 26 per cent in the 2000s. 
 
Denmark-1980 (DEN80), Denmark-1990 (DEN90) and Denmark-2000 (DEN00) 
In Denmark the Pension Supplement is withdrawn at a rate of 30 per cent for singles since the 
loosening of the income test in 1987 (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 
2011). By combining data on Pension Supplement recipients from Statistics Denmark, and OECD 
population data, I calculate that the proportion of over 65s in receipt of means tested pension 
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benefits in Denmark has risen from 56 per cent in the 1980s, to 73 per cent in the 1990s, to 80 
per cent in the 2000s (Statistics Denmark, 2012). 
 
Ireland-1980 (IRE80), Ireland-1990 (IRE90) and Ireland-2000 (IRE00) 
In Ireland the State Pension (Non-Contributory) is the means-tested safety net. There is a small 
weekly disregard; in 2008 this consisted of thirty Euros disregarded in the means test, and an 
additional two hundred Euros disregarded in the earnings test. Otherwise, the benefit is 
withdrawn at 100 per cent of income. There is also an assets test, under which capital sums of 
more 20,000 Euros are converted to income using a standard formula (Organisation for Economic 
Co-operation and Development, 2011). 
The Irish government publishes an annual Statistical Report on Social Welfare Services (Various 
Issues: 1998: 24; 2006: 26; 2011: 30) from which it is possible to find the number of recipients of 
the Old Age (Non-Contributory) pension dating back to 1989. With the help of OECD population 
data (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Various Years) I therefore 
calculate an approximate value for the proportion of over 66s receiving means-tested benefits in 
Ireland. The data shows that there has been a decline in the recipients of the State Pension (Non-
Contributory) over the three decades since 1980, from around 23 per cent of the over 66s in the 
80s, to 19 per cent in the 90s and 14 percent in the 2000s. Although the data is not available 
before 1989, it is safe to say that 23% is a conservative estimate of the proportion of elderly 
receiving means tested benefits in Ireland in the 1980s, since the prevalence of means testing has 
steadily declined since the Social Welfare Act of 1988 extended the coverage of the contributory 
state pension (Houses of the Oireachtas, 2012).  
 
Netherlands-1980 (NET80), Netherlands-1990 (NET90) and Netherlands-2000 (NET00) 
The Netherlands has no means-tested state pension.  
 
New Zealand-1980 (NZ80), New Zealand-1990 (NZ90) and New Zealand-2000 (NZ00) 
In 1986 New Zealand introduced an affluence test in the form of the Superannuation Surcharge. 
In the first year of the surcharge about 10 per cent of superannuitants paid the equivalent of their 
full superannuation back in surcharge payments, and about 13 per cent repaid a partial amount. 
This makes a total of 23 per cent of superannuitants affected by the surcharge. In 1990, the 
surcharge rate was increased from 20 to 25 per cent of assessable income and the income 
exemption was lowered, and this was expected to result in more superannuitants being affected 
by the surcharge (Preston, 2001). Subsequent changes in the investment decisions of those 
affected meant that by the time the surcharge was abolished in 1997, it was paid by just 14 per 
cent of superannuitants. However, what is relevant here is those affected rather than the amount 
of revenue the government received, and consequently I take 23 per cent to be the best estimate 
of the proportion of superannuitants affected by this affluence test (New Zealand Ministry of 
Social Development, 2003: 4; New Zealand Parliamentary Debate, 1997, July 31).  
 
Switzerland-1980 (SWI80), Switzerland-1990 (SWI90) and Switzerland-2000 (SWI00) 
By combining data from the Swiss Federal Social Insurance Office on the number of recipients of 
the means-tested Ergänzungsleistungen - Prestations Complémentaires (EL-PC) with OECD 
population data (Office Fédéral des Assurances Sociales - Secteur Statistique, 2011), I calculated 
that the proportion of over 65s receiving means tested pensions averaged 11 per cent in the 
1980s, 12 per cent in the 1990s, and 13 percent in the 2000s. 
 
United Kingdom-1980 (UK80), United Kingdom-1990 (UK90) and United Kingdom-2000 
(UK00) 
In the UK pension system means tested benefits evolved over time, from Income Support and the 
Minimum Income Guarantee (MIG), which was withdrawn at a rate of 100 per cent, to the Pension 
Credit which replaced the MIG in 2002 was withdrawn at a rate of 40 per cent (Emmerson & 
Disney, 2005: 75). The Department for Work and Pensions publishes data on the number of 
people aged 60 and over receiving Income Support, the MIG, or the Pension Credit (Office for 
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National Statistics, 2009). Unfortunately, data is available only from 1994. By combining the 
available data with OECD population data, I have calculated that the average proportion of over 
65s in the 1990s receiving income tested benefits is 18 per cent, and the average for the 2000s is 
25 per cent. Since the role of means testing in the UK pension system is expected to have increased 
as a result of the decision to index the state pension to prices rather than earnings from 1980, it 
is safe to assume that the prevalence of means testing was lower in the 1980s than it was in the 
1990s. Since how much lower cannot be determined, and the prevalence of means testing in the 
1990s lies fairly close to the 0.5 anchor of 15 per cent, I run the QCA twice, once assigning the 
case UK80 a hi_targ value of 0 and once assigning it a hi_targ value of 1. As expected, due to the 
effect of other conditions (notably lo_erel) the choice has no effect on the solution term.  
 
United States-1980 (US80), United States-1990 (US90) and United States-2000 (US00) 
In the US, the means tested Supplementary Security Income (SSI) is subject to strict income and 
assets tests. There is a small (US$20 per month) disregard in calculating the SSI entitlement, and 
the benefit is withdrawn at rate of 100 per cent against income above this level. Although states 
can supplement the SSI, in my analysis I take into account only the federal benefit. By combining 
data from the SSI Annual Report on the number of Federally Administered SSI Applications for 
the Aged (from SSI Annual Report 2011: 31) with OECD population data, I calculated that on 
average only 1 per cent of the over 65s applied for the SSI in 1980s and 1990s and that this 
proportion fell to below 1 percent in the 2000s (Office for National Statistics, 2009). 
 
 
Table A4. Calibration of condition hi_targ 
Case 
Prevalence of 
means test (% 
of over 65s) 
Prevalence of 
affluence test 
(% of over 
65s) 
Total 
Prevalence of 
targeting 
Fuzzy-set 
score 
(robustness 
check) 
Crisp-set 
score 
AUS80 84 0 84 0.98 1 
AUS90 73 0 73 0.97 1 
AUS20 73 0 73 0.97 1 
CAN80 49 0 49 0.88 1 
CAN90 39 5 44 0.85 1 
CAN20 35 5 40 0.82 1 
DEN80 56 n/a 56 0.92 1 
DEN90 73 n/a 73 0.97 1 
DEN20 80 n/a 80 0.98 1 
IRE80 30 n/a 30 0.71 1 
IRE90 26 n/a 26 0.66 1 
IRE20 20 n/a 20 0.57 1 
NET80 n/a n/a 0 0.01 0 
NET90 n/a n/a 0 0.01 0 
NET20 n/a n/a 0 0.01 0 
NZ80 n/a n/a 0 0.01 0 
NZ90 n/a 23 23 0.62 1 
NZ20 n/a n/a 0 0.01 0 
SWI80 11 n/a 11 0.21 0 
SWI90 12 n/a 12 0.27 0 
SWI20 13 n/a 13 0.34 0 
UK80* 18 n/a 18 0.54 1 
UK90 18 n/a 18 0.54 1 
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UK20 25 n/a 25 0.65 1 
US80 1 n/a 1 0.01 0 
US90 1 n/a 1 0.01 0 
US20 0 n/a 1 0.01 0 
*Assumed value due to missing data 
 
 
The absence of a significant earnings-related state pension (lo_erel) 
 
 
To capture the existence and significance of the state earnings-related alternative I use 
OECD data on ‘the % contribution of public earnings-related pensions to average 
pension wealth’ to identify those market-heavy pension systems with negligible 
earnings-related state pensions, and assign to these countries full membership of the 
set ‘cases with no significant earnings-related state pension’. On this basis Australia, 
Denmark, Ireland, the Netherlands and New Zealand score full set membership.  
For those countries with non-negligible earnings-related state pensions, namely 
Canada, Switzerland, the UK and the US, I record for each decade the statutory 
replacement rate that accrues at average earnings from the earnings-related pension 
(Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 2011, Office for National 
Statistics, 2011). The replacement rate data ranges from 10% in the UK in the 2000s to 
32% in the US, and is presented in Table C4, the summary table at the end of this 
section. I use this data to construct a four-value fuzzy set as shown in Table C3 below.  
 
Table A5. Coding scheme for lo_erel 
Replacement rate Fuzzy-set score 
Membership of the set ‘cases 
with no significant earnings-
related state pension’ 
x = 0 1 Fully in 
0 < x > 20 0.67 More in than out 
20 ≤ x > 25 0.33 More out than in 
x ≥ 25 0 Fully out 
 
 
I assign full non-membership of the set ‘cases with no significant earnings-related 
state pension’ if the replacement rate is more than or equal to 25%, as this was the 
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replacement rate offered by the archetypical State Earnings Related Pension (SERPS) 
of the UK in the 1980s. On this basis, Canada, the US, and the UK in the 1980s score 
zero. The Social Security Act of 1986 reduced the SERPS accrual rate from 25 to 20%. 
To capture this reduction in the statutory replacement rate, I deem the UK in the 1990s 
to fall short of full non-membership, but to remain ‘more out than in’ the set of cases 
with no significant earnings-related pension. By this logic, I assign to it a fuzzy-set 
score of 0.33. Finally, I deem Switzerland and the UK in the 2000s to be ‘more in than 
out’ of the set of cases with no significant earnings-related pension and assign to them 
a fuzzy-set score of 0.67 on the grounds that they have an earnings-related pension, 
but the replacement rate that accrues at average earnings is below 20%. 
 
Low national savings (lo_natsav) 
 
I collect annual data from the World Bank on net national savings, as a % of Gross 
National Income (GNI) and average it over country-decades. In order to identify the 
point of maximum ambiguity for the set of ‘cases that have low net national savings’, 
I identify the most prominent gap in the net national savings data, which lies between 
and 5.99 and 7.91 % of GNI. I use this prominent gap to place the point of maximum 
ambiguity at 6.95 % of GNI. The idea that this gap is a suitable anchor for the point of 
maximum ambiguity about membership in the set ‘cases that have low net national 
savings’ is reinforced by data I have collected from the OECD on the current account 
balance - with only two exceptions, all those country-decades with a current account 
surplus have net national savings equal to or above 7.91% of GNI, and all those 
countries with a current account deficit have net national savings below 5.99% of GNI. 
I locate the anchors for full membership and full non-membership of the set according 
to the next most prominent gaps in the net national savings data. The threshold for 
full non-membership is at the point where net national savings as a percentage of GNI 
= 14.43993 and the threshold for full membership is at 2.267804 % of GNI. 
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Non-left party control of government (non_left) 
 
To capture the expectation that in a time of austerity it may be difficult for left-of-
centre governments to pass costly universalizing reform, I include an indicator of 
partisanship using data from the Comparative Political Data Set (CPDS) on percentage 
of total cabinet posts held by non-left parties (Armingeon et al., 2011). According the 
CPDS, left parties are those classed as ‘Social Democratic’ or ‘left of Social Democratic’, 
and non-left parties consist of Liberal and Conservative parties, as well as centre-right 
parties that favour a ‘moderate social amelioration in a location to the left of 
Conservative or Conservative neo-liberal parties’, in particular Christian Democratic 
or Catholic parties (CPDS codebook: 25).  
 
Because my cases represent country-decades, a single case may contain more than one 
government and therefore a change in the partisanship indicator. I deal with this as 
follows: where there has been a reform, I use the % of total cabinet posts held by non-
left parties in the year when the reform was passed (if in a particular decade there was 
more than one universalizing reform, I take the average over any years when 
universalizing reforms were passed). In decades where there was no universalizing 
reform, I take the approach of averaging the % of total cabinet posts held by non-left 
parties over the decade. Following the logic behind the CPDS indicator, I calibrate 
membership in the fuzzy set ‘non-left parties are dominant’ by setting 66.6% as the 
anchor for full set membership, 33.3% as the anchor for full non membership, and 
49.95% (the midpoint between 33.3 and 66.6) as the point of maximum ambiguity 
regarding set membership. 
 
General taxation finance (broad_fin) 
 
I include an indicator of the financing arrangements of the state pension, intended to 
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capture the idea that where a contributory pension system leaves many people 
uncovered and reliant on means-tested benefits, those who pay for both their own 
pension through social insurance contributions as well as the means tested benefits of 
others through general taxation have an interest in reforms to broaden the coverage 
of the contributory system, because in so doing they may broaden the tax base and 
spread their burden. This logic is captured using a simple binary indicator of whether 
or not the state pension is financed by general taxation. 
 
Table A6. Summary table of underlying data 
Case 
Proportion of 
elderly 
receiving 
means-tested 
benefits or 
affected by an 
affluence test 
Replacement rate 
accruing from the 
earnings-related 
state pension, at 
average earnings 
Net national 
savings as a 
percentage of 
Gross National 
Income 
Percentage of 
total cabinet seats 
held by non-left 
parties 
AUS80 84 0 6 0 
AUS90 73 0 4 38 
AUS20 73 0 6 97 
CAN80 49 25 9 100 
CAN90 44 25 5 100 
CAN20 40 25 9 100 
DEN80 56 0 5 100 
DEN90 73 0 6 25 
DEN20 80 0 8 85 
IRE80 30 0 10 100 
IRE90 26 0 16 81 
IRE20 20 0 14 100 
NET80 0 0 10 96 
NET90 0 0 11 79 
NET20 0 0 11 79 
NZ80 0 0 4 46 
NZ90 23 0 2 100 
NZ20 0 0 4 11 
SWI80 11 16 15 71 
SWI90 12 16 13 71 
SWI20 
UK80 
13 
18 
16 
25 
13 
4 
71 
100 
UK90 
UK20 
18 
25 
20 
10 
3 
4 
73 
0 
US80 1 32 6 100 
US90 1 32 5 100 
US20 1 32 2 100 
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Table A7. Summary table of all crisp and fuzzy set scores 
Case reform hi_targ lo_erel lo_natsav non_left broad_fin 
AUS80 0 1 1 0.67 0 1 
AUS90 0 1 1 0.89 0.1 1 
AUS20 1 1 1 0.66 1 1 
CAN80 0 1 0 0.33 1 1 
CAN90 0 1 0 0.82 1 1 
CAN20 0 1 0 0.27 1 1 
DEN80 1 1 1 0.82 1 1 
DEN90 0.33 1 1 0.65 0.01 1 
DEN20 0 1 1 0.4 1 1 
IRE80 1 1 1 0.24 1 0 
IRE90 0.67 1 1 0.02 1 0 
IRE20 0.67 1 1 0.05 1 0 
NET80 0 0 1 0.22 1 0 
NET90 0 0 1 0.18 0.99 0 
NET20 0 0 1 0.15 0.99 0 
NZ80 0 0 1 0.86 0.33 1 
NZ90 1 1 1 0.96 1 1 
NZ20 0 0 1 0.9 0 1 
SWI80 0 0 0.67 0.04 0.98 0 
SWI90 0 0 0.67 0.09 0.98 0 
SWI20 0 0 0.67 0.08 0.98 0 
UK80 0 1 0 0.89 1 0 
UK90 0 1 0.33 0.91 0.98 0 
UK20 1 1 0.67 0.9 0 0 
US80 0 0 0 0.7 1 0 
US90 0 0 0 0.75 1 0 
US20 0 0 0 0.95 1 0 
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Solution Tables 
 
A8. Analysis of sufficient conditions for the outcome 'significant universalising reform', 
conservative solution 
Solution 
hi_targ* lo_erel* 
lo_natsav* 
broad_fin*  
non_left 
+ 
hi_targ* lo_erel* 
~lo_natsav* 
~broad_fin*  
non_left 
+ 
hi_targ* 
lo_erel* 
lo_natsav* 
~broad_fin* ~ 
non_left 
→ 
refor
m 
Single 
country 
coverage 
DEN80, NZ90, 
AUS00 
 
IRE80, 
IRE90,IRE00 
 
 
UK00 
 
  
 
Consisten
cy 
 
0.830508 
  
0.755396 
  
0.971014 
  
Raw 
Coverage 
 
0.367316 
  
0.314843 
  
0.100450 
  
Unique 
Coverage 
 
0.367316 
  
0.314843 
  
0.100450 
  
 
Solution consistency: 0.815625; Solution coverage: 0.782609 
Model: reform = f(hi_targ, lo_erel, lo_natsav, broad_fin, non_left). Conservative solution. 
Frequency cutoff: 1.000000  
Consistency cutoff: 0.755396 
Cases in bold are uniquely covered by the relevant solution term 
 
A9. Analysis of sufficient conditions for the outcome 'significant universalising reform', 
parsimonious solution 
Solution 
lo_erel* lo_natsav*  
non_left 
+ 
hi_targ* lo_erel* 
~broad_fin  
→ reform 
Single 
country 
coverage 
DEN80, NZ90, AUS00  
IRE80, IRE90,IRE00, 
UK00 
  
 
Consistency 
 
0.589744 
  
0.752500 
  
Raw 
Coverage 
 
0.413793 
  
0.451274 
  
Unique 
Coverage 
 
0.367316 
  
0.404798  
  
 
Solution consistency: 0.679105; Solution coverage: 0.818591 
Model: reform = f(hi_targ, lo_erel, lo_natsav, broad_fin, non_left). Parsimonious solution. 
Frequency cutoff: 1.000000  
Consistency cutoff: 0.755396 
Cases in bold are uniquely covered by the relevant solution term 
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A10. Analysis of sufficient conditions for the outcome 'no significant universalizing 
reform', intermediate solution 
Solution  ~lo_erel  + ~ non_left   + 
~hi_targ* 
~lo_natsav 
→~reform 
Single 
country 
coverage 
 
US80  US90  US00 
UK80 UK90 
CAN80 CAN90 
CAN00 
 
AUS80 
AUS90 NZ80 
NZ00 DEN90 
UK00 
 
NET80 NET90 
NET00 SWI80 
SWI90 SWI20 
 
Consistency 0.963293 
 
0.766784 
 
1.000000  
Raw 
Coverage 
0.425971  0.213478  0.299065  
Unique 
Coverage 
0.346778 
 
0.196754 
 
0.208067  
Solution consistency: 0.928533; Solution coverage: 0.843581 
Model: ~reform = f(hi_targ, lo_erel, lo_natsav, non_left). Intermediate solution. 
Frequency cut-off: 1.000000, Consistency cut-off: 0.768965. 
Cases in bold are uniquely covered by the relevant solution term. 
Assumptions: ~non_left (absent);  ~lo_natsav (absent); ~lo_erel (absent) 
 
 
Truth Tables 
 
A11. Truth Table for ‘reform’ using country-decade cases 
hi_targ2 lo_erel lo_natsav hi_right broad_fin number reform raw 
consist. 
PRI 
consist. 
SYM 
consist 
1 1 1 0 0 1 1 0.971014 0.971014 1 
1 1 1 1 1 3 1 0.830508 0.829932 0.995935 
1 1 0 1 0 3 1 0.755396 0.679245 0.76087 
1 1 0 1 1 1 0 0.448819 0.444444 0.982759 
1 1 1 0 1 3 0 0.149321 0 0.5 
0 1 1 0 1 2 0 0 0  
1 0 0 1 1 2 0 0 0  
1 0 1 1 0 2 0 0 0  
1 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0  
0 0 1 1 0 3 0 0 0  
0 1 0 1 0 6 0 0 0  
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A12. Truth Table for ‘~reform’ using country-decade cases 
hi_targ2 lo_erel lo_natsav hi_right number ~reform raw 
consist. 
PRI 
consist. 
SYM 
consist 
0 1 0 1 6 1 1 1 1 
0 1 1 0 2 1 1 1 1 
1 0 1 1 3 1 1 1 1 
0 0 1 1 3 1 1 1 1 
1 0 0 1 2 1 1 1 1 
1 1 1 0 4 1 0.768965 0.7393 0.871094 
1 1 0 1 4 0 0.360494 0.233728 0.685446 
1 1 1 1 3 0 0.253482 0.236467 0.919192 
 
 
A13. Truth Table for ‘~reform’ using county-five-year cases  
hi_targ lo_erel lo_natsav1 hi_right1 number ~reform raw 
consist. 
PRI 
consist. 
SYM 
consist 
0 1 0 1 12 1 1 1 1 
0 1 1 0 2 1 1 1 1 
0 0 0 1 2 1 1 1 1 
1 0 0 1 4 1 1 1 1 
1 0 1 1 5 1 1 1 1 
0 0 1 1 4 1 1 1 1 
0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
1 1 1 0 7 1 0.760714 0.74573 0.928105 
1 1 1 1 6 0 0.664678 0.645202 0.923715 
1 1 0 1 10 0 0.643973 0.620238 0.911532 
1 0 1 0 1 0 0.488372 0.488372 1 
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Analysis of sufficient conditions with country-five-years as cases 
 
I recoded the data into country-five-year cases, and conduct the QCA again. In the 
five-year analysis, the causal conditions are insufficient to explain the majority of cases 
of reform. Most cases of reform remain uncovered by the solution formula, reflecting 
the fact that sometimes the presence of all the causal conditions was not in itself 
sufficient to bring about reform within a five year period.  
 
The analysis of the non-reform case using country-five-years as cases has greater 
explanatory power, and reinforces the country-decade analyses. The table below 
presents the results. Again, three ‘paths’ to non-reform emerge. The first path, with a 
consistency score of 1.000000, uniquely covers the UK from 1980 to 1995, and Canada 
from 1980 to 2009. It reinforces the idea that the presence of a significant earnings-
related pension is sufficient to explain the absence of universalizing reforms in these 
cases - even in the presence of a non-left government.  
 
The second path reinforces the idea that the presence of a left party in government is 
sufficient to explain why there were no universalizing reforms - despite the absence 
of a significant earnings related pension - in Australia between 1985 and 1994, in New 
Zealand between 1985 and 1990, and in Denmark between 1980 and 1984 and between 
1995 and 2000. Again, the high consistency score of 0.817783 masks the seemingly 
deviant case of the UK in the 2000s.  
 
The solution formula reinforces the causal importance of targeting for bringing about 
universalizing reform. In addition to uniquely explaining the absence of reform in 
Switzerland and the Netherlands, the third ‘path’ shows that ‘the non-prevalence of 
targeting’ – or rather the high coverage of non-means tested pensions of which this is 
the flip-side – is also sufficient to explain the complete absence of universalizing 
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reform in the US, and the absence of reform in New Zealand between 1980 and 1984 
and between 2000 and 2009.  
 
Overall, the five-year analysis suggests that the causal conditions identified under 
country-decade cases are robust, but that more information is needed if we are to 
understand why sometimes the presence of all the causal conditions was not sufficient 
to bring about reform within the five year period. Ultimately, the choice of country-
decades as cases strikes an appropriate balance between parsimony, and explaining 
the myriad reasons why reforms do not occur the moment the relevant sufficient 
conditions are in place. 
 
A14. 'Five-year' analysis of sufficient conditions for the outcome 'no significant 
universalising reform', intermediate solution 
Solution 
non_left*  
~lo_erel  
+ 
~ non_left* 
lo_erel   
+ ~hi_targ → ~reform 
Single 
country 
coverag
e 
UK80, UK85, 
UK90, CAN80, 
CAN85, CAN90, 
CAN95, CAN00, 
CAN05, US80, 
US85, US90, 
US95, US00, 
US05 
 
AUS85, 
AUS90, NZ85, 
NZ00, NZ05, 
DEN80, 
DEN95, UK20, 
UK25 
 
NET85, NET90, 
NET95, NET00, 
NET05, SWI80, 
SWI85, SWI90, 
SWI95, SWI00, 
SWI05, NZ80, 
NZ00, NZ05, 
US80, US85, 
US90, US95, 
US00, US05 
  
 
Consiste
ncy 
 
1.000000 
  
0.817783 
 
1.000000   
Raw 
Coverag
e 
 
0.375469 
  
0.164350 
 
0.463269   
Unique 
Coverag
e 
 
0.192146 
  
0.098390 
 
0.231193   
 Solution consistency: 0.954093; Solution coverage: 0.761085 
Model: ~reform = f(hi_targ, lo_erel, lo_natsav, non_left). Intermediate solution. Country-five-
years as cases. 
Frequency cutoff: 1.000000. Consistency cutoff: 0.760714. Cases in bold are uniquely covered 
by the relevant solution term. 
Assumptions: ~non_left (absent)  ~lo_natsav (absent) ~lo_erel (absent) ~hi_targ (absent)  
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